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What are the consequences for monetary policy design implied by the fact
that price setting and investment takes typically place simultaneously at the
￿rm level? To address this question we analyze simple (constrained) optimal
interest rate rules in the context of a dynamic New Keynesian model featuring
￿rm-speci￿c capital accumulation as well as sticky prices and wages ￿ la Calvo.
We make the case for Taylor type rules. They are remarkably robust in the
sense that their welfare implications do not appear to hinge neither on the
speci￿c assumptions regarding capital accumulation that are used in their
derivation nor on the particular de￿nition of natural output that is used to
construct the output gap. On the other hand we ￿nd that rules prescribing
that the central bank does not react to any measure of real economic activity
are not robust in that sense.
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11 Introduction
How does ￿rm-speci￿c capital accumulation a⁄ect the desirability of alternative
arrangements for the conduct of monetary policy? We address this question em-
ploying a New Keynesian (NK) framework, i.e. a dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model featuring nominal rigidities combined with monopolistic competition.
Speci￿cally, we consider an economic environment with sticky prices and wages ￿
la Calvo (1983). Our model is therefore similar to the one developed in Erceg et
al. (2000) except for the fact that we allow for capital accumulation.1 The welfare
criterion is derived from the utility of the representative household, along the lines
of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
What is the relevance of our analysis? Edge (2003) shows how the work by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) can be extended to conduct a welfare analysis in
the context of a NK model where capital accumulation is endogenous. She assumes,
however, that ￿rms have access to a rental market for capital,2 which is not an
innocuous simpli￿cation in a NK model, as analyzed in Sveen and Weinke (2003,
2004, 2005a) and Woodford (2003, Ch. 5, 2005).3 In the present paper we show how
a welfare analysis can be conducted in the context of a NK model featuring ￿rm-
speci￿c capital accumulation (FS for short). Moreover we explain how and why the
conclusions regarding the desirability of monetary policy change if a rental market
for capital (RM for short) is assumed instead.
We obtain three results. First, the implied price stickiness is the main di⁄erence
between FS and RM as far as their welfare implications are concerned. Sveen and
Weinke (2005a) show that this is the only di⁄erence between the two models if atten-
1Erceg et al. (2000) assume that the aggregate capital stock is constant and that there exists
a rental market for capital.
2Another di⁄erence between our work and Edge￿ s is that she assumes frictionless investment
whereas we follow Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming a convex adjustment cost at the ￿rm level.
3Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004) argue that both the rental market assumption and the as-
sumption of ￿rm-speci￿c capital are somewhat extreme. However, the work by Altig et al. (2005)
suggests that the assumption of ￿rm-speci￿c capital is appealing on empirical grounds.
2tion is restricted to a ￿rst order approximation to the equilibrium dynamics. Here
we show that the additional endogenous price stickiness implied by the presence of
￿rm-speci￿c capital (and the lack thereof under RM) is also the key player as far
as the welfare implications of the two alternative speci￿cations are concerned. This
is interesting and surprising because our welfare criterion, a second order approxi-
mation to the unconditional expectation of the household￿ s utility, is not identical
in the two models if we change the price stickiness in one of them in such a way
that the ￿rst order approximations to the respective equilibrium dynamics would be
identical. Optimized interest rate rules therefore prescribe putting relatively more
weight on price in￿ ation than on wage in￿ ation under FS, whereas the opposite is
true under RM. This is important for the following reason. Suppose that the cen-
tral bank does not react to any measure of real economic activity. Then using the
optimized interest rate rule associated with RM in the FS speci￿cation implies a
large welfare loss, as we discuss. Let us relate that result to the existing literature.
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005b) show in the context of a rental market model that
the relative weight attached to price- and to wage in￿ ation in an optimized interest
rate rule depends crucially on which nominal variable is stickier.4 We show that
the di⁄erence in policy implications between FS and RM can be understood in an
analogous way.
We also analyze Taylor type rules, i.e. interest rate rules prescribing that the
central bank reacts to price in￿ ation and to the output gap. Our second result
is that these interest rate rules are remarkably robust in the following sense. If
the optimized rule implied by one model is used in the other one then the resulting
welfare loss is small compared with the outcome under the optimized rule associated
with that model. Consequently, the central bank does not need to take a stand on
4In related work Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005a) make the case for price stability as the
central goal of optimal monetary policy. They show that desirable outcomes can be implemented
by a combination of passive monetary and active ￿scal policy. In the present paper we focus
exclusively on optimal monetary policy.
3which speci￿cation of capital accumulation is the empirically more plausible one if
it uses a Taylor type rule.
But how should the output gap be de￿ned? So far there is no consensus in the
literature on the answer to that question. Neiss and Nelson (2003) and Woodford
(2003, Ch. 5) propose two alternative de￿nitions. Our third result is that the dif-
ference between these two competing de￿nitions matters very little for the resulting
welfare implications and we explain why this is so.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is outlined in
Section 2. We present the welfare criterion in Section 3. Our results are shown and
interpreted in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences, Market Structure and Technology
2.1.1 Households
The model we use to analyze the implications of ￿rm-speci￿c capital accumulation
for monetary policy design is a NK framework with complete ￿nancial markets.
Throughout the analysis the subscript t is used to indicate that a variable is dated






where ￿ is the subjective discount factor. Moreover Nt (h) denotes hours worked











4where " is the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent varieties of goods Ct (i).









Requiring optimal allocation of any spending on the available goods implies that
consumption expenditure can be written as PtCt. Household h￿ s period utility is
given by the following function:










where parameter ￿ denotes the household￿ s relative risk aversion and parameter ￿
can be interpreted as the the inverse of the Frisch aggregate labor supply elasticity.
Our assumptions of separable preferences combined with complete ￿nancial mar-
kets imply that the heterogeneity across households in their hours worked does not
translate into consumption heterogeneity. This is re￿ ected in our notation. Each
household is assumed to be the monopolistically competitive supplier of its di⁄eren-
tiated type of labor, Nt (h). We also assume staggered wage setting ￿ la Erceg et al.
(2000), i.e. each ￿rm faces a constant and exogenous probability, ￿w, of getting to
reoptimize its wage in any given period. Optimizing behavior on the part of ￿rms
implies that demand for type h labor, Nd











where Wt (h) denotes the nominal wage posted by household h and "N gives the
elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent types of labor. Finally, Wt and Nd
t denote,
respectively, the aggregate nominal wage and aggregate labor demand. They are
de￿ned as the corresponding aggregate prices and quantities for goods.
5Under standard assumptions the relevant budget constraint prescribes that the
present value of all expenditures cannot be greater than the value of a household￿ s
initial assets and the present value of its income. The latter derives from wage
payments and pro￿ts resulting from ownership of ￿rms net of taxes.5 We assume
that there are only lump sum taxes and the only role of the government is to levy
these taxes to ￿nance subsidies in goods and factor markets which render the steady
state of our model Pareto optimal. This assumption in turn is needed to compute
our welfare criterion up to the second order using a ￿rst order approximation to the
equilibrium dynamics.
For future reference let us note two implications of households￿optimizing be-
havior. First, we obtain a stochastic discount factor for random nominal payments,










The stochastic discount factor is linked to the gross nominal interest rate, Rt, by
the relationship Et fQt;t+1g = R
￿1
t which holds in equilibrium.

















where MRSt (h) ￿ Nt (h)
￿ C￿
t is the (negative of the) marginal rate of substitution
of consumption for leisure of household h.
2.1.2 Firms
There is a continuum of ￿rms and each of them is the monopolistically competitive
producer of a di⁄erentiated good. Each ￿rm i is assumed to maximize its market






where we have used the notation ￿t(i) for ￿rm i￿ s cash ￿ ows. The maximization is
subject to the following constraints.
Each ￿rm i has access to a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt (i) = AtKt (i)
￿ Nt (i)
1￿￿ ; (7)
where parameter ￿ measures the capital share in the production function. Aggregate
technology is given by At and Kt (i) and Nt (i) denote, respectively, ￿rm i￿ s capital
stock and labor input used in its production Yt (i). As in Erceg et al. (2000)
technology shocks are assumed to be the only source of aggregate uncertainty in
our model.6 Speci￿cally, we consider a stationary AR(1) process for the log of
technology:
at = ￿aat￿1 + "t; (8)
where parameter ￿a 2 (0;1) and "t is assumed to be iid.
Firms face three additional restrictions. First, we assume Calvo (1983) pricing,
i.e. each ￿rm faces a constant and exogenous probability, ￿, of getting to reoptimize
its price in any given period. Second, we follow Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming
that investment at the ￿rm level is restricted in the following way:






In the last equation It (i) denotes the amount of the composite good7 necessary
to change ￿rm i￿ s capital stock from Kt (i) to Kt+1 (i) one period later. Moreover,
6Of course, the extent to which technology shocks are an important source behind the observable
business cycle ￿ uctuations is the topic of an ongoing debate. See, e.g., Gal￿ and Rabanal (2004).
7We assume that the elasticity of substitution is the same as in the consumption aggregate.
7function I(￿) is assumed to satisfy the following: I(1) = ￿, I0(1) = 1, and I00(1) = ￿ .
Parameter ￿ denotes the depreciation rate and ￿  > 0 measures the convex capital
adjustment cost in a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics. Third,
cost minimization by ￿rms and households implies that demand for each individual












t denotes aggregate demand which is given by:
Y
d
t ￿ Ct + It; (11)
and It ￿
R 1
0 It (i)di denotes aggregate investment demand. A ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ows,
￿t(i), are therefore given by the following expression:
￿t(i) = Y
d
t (i)Pt(i) ￿ WtNt(i) ￿ PtIt(i): (12)
For future reference let us mention two implications of optimizing behavior at the















MPLt(i) is the marginal return to ￿rm i￿ s capital. Second, let us


















t (i) ￿ Wt
MPLt(i) measures the nominal marginal cost and MPLt (i) is the
marginal product of labor of ￿rm i.
82.1.3 Market clearing
Clearing of the labor market requires for each type of labor h:
Nt (h) = N
d
t (h): (15)
Likewise, market clearing for each variety i requires at each point in time,
Yt (i) = C
d




t (i) is consumption demand for good i while Id
t (i) denotes investment
demand for that good. To close the model we need to specify monetary policy. We
will come back to that point.
2.2 Some Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
The starting point of our welfare analysis is a linear approximation to the equilib-
rium dynamics around a steady state with zero in￿ ation. Since the details of the
linearization have been developed elsewhere8 we just brie￿ y mention the resulting
equilibrium conditions. In what follows all variables are expressed in terms of logs
and we ignore constants throughout. Let us already note that the linearized equi-
librium conditions are identical for FS and RM, except for the respective in￿ ation
equations.
The Euler equation reads:
ct = Etct+1 ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿); (17)
where ￿ ￿ ￿log￿ is the time discount rate. We have also used the notation it ￿






8See, e.g., Erceg et al. (2000), Sveen and Weinke (2005a) and Woodford (2005).
9The law of motion of capital is obtained from averaging and aggregating opti-
mizing investment decisions on the part of ￿rms. This implies:
￿kt+1 = ￿Et￿kt+2 +
1
￿ 
[(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))Etmst+1 ￿ (it ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿)]; (18)
where Kt ￿
R 1
0 Kt (i)di denotes aggregate capital, and MSt ￿
R 1
0 MSt (i)di mea-
sures the average real marginal return to capital.
Up to the ￿rst order aggregate production is pinned down by aggregate labor,
capital and technology:
yt = at + ￿kt + (1 ￿ ￿)nt: (19)
As in Erceg et al. (2000) the wage in￿ ation equation results from averaging and
aggregating optimal wage setting decisions on the part of households. It takes the
following simple form:
!t = ￿Et!t+1 + ￿! (mrst ￿ rwt); (20)





denotes wage in￿ ation, MRSt ￿
R 1
0 MRSt (h)dh gives









The price in￿ ation equation associated with FS takes the familiar form:






Pt di denotes the average real marginal cost. The only di⁄er-
ence with respect to the one implied by RM is that the coe¢ cient premultiplying
the real marginal cost, ￿, is now computed numerically, as discussed in Woodford
(2005). In RM parameter ￿ takes its standard value
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿)
￿ .
The goods market clearing equation re￿ ects our assumption that there are subsi-
10dies o⁄setting the distortions associated with monopolistic competition in goods and
labor markets. This implies that the steady state of our model is Pareto e¢ cient.
Speci￿cally, we have:
yt = ￿ct +
1 ￿ ￿
￿
[kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt]; (22)
where ￿ ￿
￿+￿(1￿￿)
￿+￿ denotes the steady state consumption to output ratio.
Let us now mention the values which we assign to the model parameters in
most of the quantitative analysis that we are going to conduct. The coe¢ cient of
autocorrelation in the process of technology, ￿a, is assumed to take the value 0:95.
We set the capital share ￿ = 0:36. Our choice for the risk aversion parameter ￿ is
2. The elasticity of substitution between goods " is set to 11. Our baseline value
for the Calvo parameter for price setting, ￿p, is 0:75 and we assume the same value
for its wage setting counterpart ￿w. The rate of capital depreciation, ￿, is assumed
to be equal to 0:025 and we set ￿  = 3. These parameter values are justi￿ed in
Sveen and Weinke (2005a), Erceg et al. (2000) and the references therein. Finally,
we set the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent types of labor "N equal to 6,
a conventional value in the empirically plausible range range between 4, as in Erceg
et al. (2000), and 21 which is the value assumed in Altig et al. (2005).
3 Welfare
We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and let the policymaker￿ s period welfare function be
the unweighted average of households￿period utility:
Wt ￿ U (Ct) +
Z 1
0
V (Nt (h))dh = U (Ct) + Eh fV (Nt (h))g: (23)
11In what follows we introduce our welfare criterion and use it to compare the impli-
cations of FS and RM for monetary policy design.
3.1 Welfare with Firm-Speci￿c Capital
The main technical novelty in the present paper is that we extend the work by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and conduct a welfare analysis in the context of
a model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital.9 Our welfare criterion is the unconditional ex-
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where superscript "*" indicates an equilibrium value associated with having ￿ exible
prices and wages. Terms independent of policy are denoted tip. A bar indicates
the steady state value of the original variable and UC is the marginal utility of
consumption. Moreover we have used the following de￿nitions: ￿t ￿ V arib pt (i), ￿t ￿
V arikt (i),  t ￿ Covi (b pt (i);kt (i)) and ￿t ￿ V arh b wt (h), where b Pt (i) ￿
Pt(i)
Pt and
c Wt (h) ￿
Wt(h)
Wt denote, respectively, ￿rm i￿ s relative to average price and household
h￿ s relative to average nominal wage. Parameters ￿FS
1 to ￿FS
10 are functions of the
structural parameters of our model. They are de￿ned in Appendix A. The key
complication that we have to face is to calculate of the cross-sectional variances of
prices and capital holdings at each point in time, as well as their covariance. We
9The proof that the method of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) can be applied to the problem
at hand carries over from Edge￿ s (2003) to our work because the relevant steady states properties
of the two models are identical.
10Maximizing that function is equivalent to maximizing E f
P1
t=0 Wtg.
12make one key observation which allows us to overcome that di¢ culty. Woodford￿ s
(2005) linearized rules for price setting and investment can be used to compute
the relevant second moments with the accuracy that we need for our second order
approximation to welfare. The details are explained in Appendix A.
3.2 Welfare with a Rental Market for Capital
In the rental market case the welfare criterion reads,
E
￿
































































as we show in Appendix B where we also de￿ne parameters ￿RM
1 to ￿RM
7 . Compared
with FS the analysis is greatly simpli￿ed in that case by the fact that the capital
labor ratio is constant across ￿rms, as discussed in Edge (2003).
4 Results
We consider two prominent families of monetary policy rules. Our ultimate goal
is to explain how and why the associated constrained optimal values of the policy
parameters change in each case depending on whether or not a rental market for
capital is assumed.
134.1 The Welfare Consequences of Responding to Price and
to Wage In￿ ation
We start by considering interest rate rules of the following kind,
rt = ￿ + ￿r (rt￿1 ￿ ￿) + ￿s [￿!!t + (1 ￿ ￿!)￿t]; (26)
where parameter ￿s measures the overall responsiveness of the nominal interest rate
to changes in in￿ ation, whereas ￿! is the relative weight put on wage in￿ ation.
The weight on price in￿ ation is therefore given by (1 ￿ ￿!). Finally, parameter ￿r
denotes the interest rate smoothing coe¢ cient. We analyze constrained optimal
rules, i.e. we restrict attention to a particular subset of possible parameter values
that parametrize the rule. Speci￿cally, we consider only positive parameter values
and moreover we require parameter ￿! to be less or equal to one.
We compare the optimized interest rate rules under FS and RM. In each case
we report the optimized coe¢ cients entering the interest rate rule as well as the
associated welfare loss. We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and measure the latter as
a fraction of Pareto-optimal consumption, divided by the productivity innovation
variance.11 The results are shown in Table 1.






11Let us give a concrete example for the interpretation of the welfare numbers in our tables.
Suppose the productivity innovation variance is 0:012. Then, the number ￿10 for welfare would
mean that the representative houshold would be willing to give up 10￿0:012￿100 = 0:1 percentage
points of steady state (Pareto optimal) consumption in order to avoid the business cycle cost
associated with the presence of the nominal rigidities in our model.
14Regardless of whether FS or RM is used the implied optimized rule prescribes
to adjust the nominal interest rate in response to changes in both wage in￿ ation
and price in￿ ation. That seems intuitive: both kinds of in￿ ation are costly in
welfare terms since we model two nominal rigidities. Interestingly, the optimized
rule prescribes to react relatively more to price in￿ ation in FS whereas the opposite
holds true in RM. Our intuition is as follows. We observe two things. First, Sveen
and Weinke (2005a) show that price stickiness can be used to measure the di⁄erence
between RM and FS, if attention is restricted to a ￿rst order approximation to the
equilibrium dynamics: the feature of ￿rm-speci￿c capital implies that price setters
internalize the consequences of their price setting decisions for the marginal cost
they face. That makes them more reluctant to change their prices in FS than under
RM.12 Speci￿cally, we show in our 2005a paper that a value of about 0:9 is needed
in RM in order to obtain equivalence with FS if the value 0:75 is assigned to the
price stickiness parameter in the latter case and all the remaining parameters are held
constant at conventional values. Put di⁄erently, the rental market assumption turns
o⁄ the endogenous price stickiness which is implied by the alternative speci￿cation
with ￿rm-speci￿c capital. Second, it is a well understood property of many New
Keynesian models that the central bank achieves the most desirable welfare outcome
if it cares relatively more about the nominal variable which is relatively stickier.13
Combining these two observations the previous ￿nding seems intuitive. Since the
rental market assumption eliminates the endogenous part of the price stickiness the
central bank should care relatively more about wage in￿ ation in that model. The
reason is endogenous wage stickiness. That feature is common to FS and RM: in
both models households internalize the consequences of their wage setting decisions
for the marginal disutility of labor they face. On the other hand, if ￿rm-speci￿c
12This kind of intuition has been originally developed in Sbordone (2002) and Gal￿ et al. (2001)
in the context of models where capital is assumed to be a constant factor. For an early model
featuring di⁄erences in the marginal cost across ￿rms see Woodford (1996).
13See, e.g., Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2003).
15capital is taken into account then the implied endogenous price stickiness is strong
enough to make it worthwhile for the central bank to care relatively more about
price in￿ ation.
So far our intuition relies on a ￿nding, namely our price stickiness metric, which
has been obtained in the context of a ￿rst order approximation to the equilibrium
dynamics. This kind of intuition could easily be misleading for our purposes here.
The reason is that the second order approximation to the household￿ s expected
utility, our welfare criterion, is not equivalent in both models if we just change the
price stickiness in such a way that the two models would be identical up to the ￿rst
order. We therefore challenge our intuition by conducting the following experiment
whose results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Robustness I: Rules from the RM Model Used in FS





We compute welfare in FS as implied by the optimized policy rule in RM under
the baseline calibration. The welfare loss increases by 29:1% with respect to the
outcome under the optimized rule for FS. Now we compute constrained optimal
policy in RM for a price stickiness parameter equal to 0:9. The implied optimized
rule looks similar to the one associated with FS under the baseline calibration.
Speci￿cally, the rule prescribes to react relatively more to price in￿ ation than to
wage in￿ ation. Moreover, the increase in welfare loss which obtains if that rule is
used in FS is just 3:6%, which we regard as being negligible. The last result suggests
that our price stickiness metric is useful from a welfare point of view.14
14In principle, wether or not the price stickiness metric is useful to tell the di⁄erence in welfare
16To further illustrate the macroeconomic consequences of three di⁄erent monetary
policy rules in Tables 1 and 2 we construct impulse responses to a one standard
deviation shock to productivity for price in￿ ation and wage in￿ ation. They are
shown in Figure 1. Under the baseline calibration the optimal simple rule for FS
implies that price in￿ ation is stabilized relatively more than it is the case if the
optimized rule for RM is used instead. However, if the price stickiness parameter is
set to 0:9 in RM then the implied optimized rule delivers an outcome in FS that is
almost identical to the one under the optimized rule for that model.


















Figure 1: Impulse responses to a technology shock with di⁄erent price and wage
in￿ ation rules.
implications between FS and RM could depend on the speci￿cation of monetary policy. For all
the policies we consider, however, our metric turns out to be useful.
17Next we consider the welfare implications of interest rate rules prescribing that
the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate not only in response to nominal
variables but also as a function of a measure of real economic activity.
4.2 The Welfare Consequences of Taylor Type Rules
We now turn to the welfare implications of Taylor type rules,
rt = ￿ + ￿r (rt￿1 ￿ ￿) + ￿s [￿yy
gap
t + (1 ￿ ￿y)￿t]; (27)
where parameter ￿y denotes the relative weight put on the output gap. The resulting
weight on price in￿ ation is therefore given by (1 ￿ ￿y). The output gap, y
gap
t , is
generally de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the equilibrium output in an economy
with frictions and natural output, i.e. the equilibrium output that would obtain in
the absence of nominal frictions. In the context of a model featuring endogenous
capital accumulation Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) proposes to re￿ne the notion of natural
output in the following way. He uses the equilibrium output that would obtain if the
nominal rigidities were absent and expected to be absent in the future but taking
as given the capital stock resulting from optimizing investment behavior in the past
in an environment with the nominal rigidities present. Woodford argues that this
measure of natural output is more closely related to equilibrium determination than
the alternative measure which has been used by Neiss and Nelson (2003). Under
their de￿nition natural output is the equilibrium output that would obtain if nominal
rigidities were not only currently absent and expected to be absent in the future but
had also been absent in the past. Indeed, intuitively, the Neiss and Nelson de￿nition
of natural output appears to be a bit arti￿cial. We ￿nd, however, that from a
practical point of view it does not matter for the design of constrained optimal
interest rate rules which concept of natural output is used to compute the output
18gap. We will come back to this point. Before that let us consider some welfare
implications of Taylor type rules using Woodford￿ s de￿nition of the output gap.15
The results are shown in Table 3.






The optimal rule implied by FS prescribes a zero weight on price in￿ ation. On
the other hand, under RM, we ￿nd that the central bank should attach some weight
to both price in￿ ation and the output gap. More importantly, however, the loss is
negligible if we compute welfare in FS using the optimized rule implied by RM. We
therefore argue that Taylor type rules are very robust. The results are shown in
table 4.
Table 4: Robustness II: Rules from the RM Model Used in FS





As the last table also indicates the welfare loss associated with using the rule
implied by RM in FS can be further reduced if the price stickiness is adjusted in RM
15Our computational strategy to calculate natural output under Woodford￿ s de￿nition is straight-
forward. First, we calculate the parameters of the linear function mapping aggregate capital and
technology into equilibrium aggregate output in an environment without any nominal frictions
present. Second, we take the equilibrium value of aggregate capital as implied by FS (or by RM
when we study that case) combine it with the the level of technology and compute Woodford￿ s
natural output invoking the above mapping.
19in such a way that both models would be identical up to the ￿rst order. Once again,
our price stickiness metric turns out to be useful. The policy implications of RM are
surprisingly accurate if an upward biased estimate of the price stickiness parameter
(of the kind that the econometrician actually obtains if she looks at the data through
the lens of that model) is used in the analysis. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the
optimal relative weight attached to the output gap in RM becomes smaller (and
hence less in line with the corresponding value implied by FS) if the price stickiness
is increased. That feature appears, however, to be speci￿c to Woodford￿ s de￿nition
of natural output, as we are going to see next.
Finally, we analyze Taylor type rules using Neiss and Nelson￿ s (2003) de￿nition
of the output gap. Our results are reported in table 5.






Overall, optimized rules implied by FS and RM are very similar to the ones
obtained before under Woodford￿ s de￿nition of the output gap. In particular, we
￿nd again that under RM the optimized rule prescribes to react to both in￿ ation and
the output gap, whereas a zero weight is attached to in￿ ation under the optimized
rule associated with FS. We also con￿rm our previous ￿nding that Taylor type rules
are very robust. If the optimized rule implied by RM is used under FS then the
resulting welfare loss is negligible and, moreover, the loss can be further reduced
if the price stickiness parameter is adjusted in RM according to our metric. The
results are shown in table 6.
20Table 6: Robustness III: Rules from the RM Model Used in FS





There is only one (small) di⁄erence with respect to the previous analysis of
Taylor type rules featuring an output gap ￿ la Woodford. Under the Neiss and
Nelson de￿nition the resulting interest rate rules become more similar between FS
and RM if we adjust the price stickiness in RM as prescribed by our metric.16
Our intuition for why the particular de￿nition of the output gap that is used in
the analysis of optimal monetary policy matters so little is simple. The capital stock
does not change much at business-cycle frequencies and the di⁄erence between the
change in capital implied by a model with and without nominal rigidities present is
even less important.
Regardless of the de￿nition of the output gap Taylor type rules appear to be very
robust. The output gap is of course not directly observable. However, our results
stress the importance of constructing (theory consistent) observable measures of
that variable.
5 Conclusion
The present paper makes progress in explaining the welfare consequences of ￿rm-
speci￿c capital accumulation. We analyze (constrained) optimal interest rate rules
prescribing that the nominal interest rate is set as a function of a small number of
16The ￿nding that, if anything, small details of the optimized interest rate rules change depending
on which measure of the output gap is used is also con￿rmed by further robustness checks that we
have conducted experimenting with alternative interst rate rules.
21macroeconomic variables. Our results suggest that Taylor type interest rate rules
are very robust. Their welfare implications do not appear to hinge neither on the
speci￿c assumptions regarding capital accumulation that are used in their derivation
nor on the particular de￿nition of natural output that is used to construct the output
gap.
22Appendix A: Welfare with Firm-Speci￿c Capital
We approximate the utility of the representative household up to the second























at ’ Eiat (i) +
1
2
￿V ariat (i). (A2)
As we have already mentioned in the text the policymaker￿ s period welfare func-
tion reads:
Wt ￿ U (Ct) +
Z 1
0
V (Nt (h))dh = U (Ct) + Eh fV (Nt (h))g: (A3)
Now we compute a second-order Taylor expansion of period welfare:
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Next we show how the linear terms in consumption and employment in the last
equation can be approximated up to the second order. We start by analyzing the
consumption portion of welfare. To this end we invoke the resource constraint.
23A1: The Resource Constraint With Convex Adjustment Cost
The resource constraint reads:
Yt = Ct + It. (A5)





























Next we analyze the investment portion of the resource constraint. Our starting
point is a second order approximation to aggregate investment:
it ’ Ei fit (i)g +
1
2
V ari fit (i)g: (A7)

















Next we invoke the result by Woodford (2005) according to which the linearized
pricing and investment rules in our model can be written as follows:
b p
￿
t (i) = b p
￿
t ￿ ￿1b kt (i); (A9)
b kt+1 (j) = ￿2b kt (j) + ￿3b pt (j); (A10)
where ￿1; ￿2 and ￿3 are parameter that can be computed numerically. We have also
used the notation b Kt (i) ￿
Kt(i)
Kt for ￿rm i￿ s relative to average capital stock. Using
















































￿3" ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿3
￿
2  t: (A11)
Next we analyze the labor portion of welfare.
A2: Aggregate Labor
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25A3: The Welfare Function
Now we combine equations (A6), (A11), (A12) and (A13) with (A4) and note
that the linear terms in the resulting expression cancel except for the ones in current
and next period￿ s aggregate capital. The economic reason is that the steady state
of our model is Pareto optimal, as analyzed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
In order to eliminate next period￿ s aggregate capital we write our welfare criterion
as E f
P1
t=0 Wtg. This allows us to invoke a result by Edge (2003). She shows that
the terms in aggregate capital in that expression cancel except for the initial one
which is independent of policy. Deriving the welfare associated with ￿ exible prices
and wages, W ￿
t , in an analogous way and substracting the resulting expression from
Wt we therefore obtain:
E
￿
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This is the expression stated in the text.
26A4: Recursive Formulation for the Variance/Covariance Terms
Next we derive recursive formulations for the variance/covariance terms. Using
again the pricing and investment rules mentioned above we arrive at the following
expressions:













 t = ￿p￿2 t￿1 + ￿p￿3￿t￿1 ￿ ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿p)￿t; (A17)





27Appendix B: Welfare with Rental Market
In the rental market case the analysis is greatly simpli￿ed by that fact that
the capital labor ratio is constant across ￿rms, as discussed in Edge (2003). The
resulting welfare criterion reads:
E
￿








































































































Finally, the variance terms can be written in a recursive manner:











as discussed in Wooford (2003, Ch, 6) and Erceg et al. (2000).
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